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THE FRACTURED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAIRNESS, THE 
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, AND DISCLOSURE AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
SOPHIE RIGNEY ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
The permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), established to prosecute ‘the most serious 
crimes of international concern’1 and thereby to assist in ending impunity for such crimes,2 is 
the pinnacle of efforts to ensure accountability for violations of international humanitarian 
law. This chapter examines how accountability for violations of international humanitarian 
and criminal law is affected by the way disclosure is undertaken in ICC trials. Disclosure of 
information relevant to the trial is closely linked to ensuring the procedural rights of an 
accused, and the fairness of the trial process. Here, I argue that the way disclosure is 
undertaken at the ICC does not give the rights of the accused ‘full respect’. Whilst procedural 
rules should reinforce the rights of an accused and ultimately the principle of a fair trial, in 
reality, the current situation of disclosure at the ICC demonstrates the disconnections between 
procedural rules, rights, and trial fairness. This chapter commences by setting out how the 
rules that govern disclosure at the ICC are connected to trial fairness and the rights of an 
accused. The chapter then moves to an analysis of the disclosure regime at the ICC, with 
particular reference to recent trials at the ICC, namely the cases of The Prosecutor v 
Lubanga3 and The Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui.4 These cases reveal that 
disclosure rules are being applied in a way that permits non-disclosure – in particular, of 
exculpatory material – by both the prosecution, and victims’ representatives. This non-
disclosure may have problematic implications for the rights of an accused, and ultimately the 
fairness of the trial. As trials are a key mechanism to ensure accountability for violations of 
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international humanitarian and criminal law, the disconnections between rules, rights, and 
fairness are an important area of examination. A fracturing of procedural rules, rights, and 
fairness in these trials may pose difficulties for accountability for such violations. 
II. FAIRNESS, RIGHTS, AND DISCLOSURE RULES: INTERLINKING AND MUTUALLY 
ENFORCING ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS? 
Trial Chambers have a responsibility to ensure trials are ‘fair and expeditious and […] 
conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses’.5 In order to ensure such a trial, procedural rules (including the body 
of rules that governs how disclosure is effectuated)6 must be applied in a way consistent with 
the accused’s rights.  In this way, trial fairness, the rights of an accused, and the procedural 
rules that govern the conduct of a trial, are interlinked; and in theory, mutually reinforcing. It 
is worth quoting Salvatore Zappalà at length on this point, as he articulates the link between 
accountability mechanisms of trial, procedural rules, and the rights of an accused: 
Respecting the rules to establish the truth requires full consistency with rights of the 
accused; these must be seen as an essential component of accurate and truthful fact 
finding on which punishment is premised. If only one of these rights is violated, in 
only one aspect, in only one instance, the whole process loses credibility and is 
likely to fail in its objective of properly establishing the truth and of imposing just 
punishment.7  
 
The rights of an accused are protected at the ICC by Article 67 of the Rome Statute. These 
rights are closely modelled on international human rights obligations in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 and are also protected in the Statutes of other 
international criminal institutions.9 The rights of an accused thus have at least three roles: 
first, they are an integral part of the ICC’s governing document; second, they form human 
rights guarantees; and third, they are also ‘part and parcel of the epistemological mechanism 
for fact finding in criminal proceedings’.10 Of the several rights the accused enjoys under 
                                                          
5 Rome Statute art 64(2). 
6 International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Doc No ICC-ASP/1/3 (adopted 9 September 
2002) (‘ICC Rules’) Rules 76-84; Rome Statute arts 61, 64, and 67. The ICC Rules and the Rome Statute to be 
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Criminal Proceedings (Oxford, 2012), 352. 
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10 Zappalà, above n 7, 145. 
Article 67 of the Rome Statute, there are two rights that are particularly affected by 
disclosure: the right to know the case alleged by the prosecution,11 and the right to time and 
facilities to prepare a defence.12 These rights are to be enjoyed ‘in full equality’, 13 and thus, 
disclosure is also closely connected with the principle of equality of arms. Christoph 
Safferling refers to a ‘kaleidoscope of rights’, which includes ‘moral principles’ such as the 
equality of arms, as well as particular precise rights which provide the individual with a 
‘realizable legal claim’.14 In Safferling’s kaleidoscope, these are constitutive of ‘fairness’.15 
The right ‘to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the 
charge’16 is closely related to disclosure, because in order to be so informed, the accused 
must receive disclosure of material that outlines these aspects of the charge. Without 
receiving such disclosure, the accused cannot know what the prosecution’s case is, and 
therefore what case they must meet. As Lars Büngener correctly points out, the information 
on the charges generally refers more to the indictment or document containing the charges; 
disclosure relates to a broader category of information, which includes ‘pieces of evidence 
and factual information which go beyond the contents of an indictment’.17 There is hence a 
distinction between the charges themselves, and the broader category of disclosable material, 
which would include witness materials, documents sought to be tendered, and potentially 
exculpatory materials. This information will form the basis for how the prosecution will set 
out its case, and what evidence might exist to support its attempt to establish guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Disclosure of this information is therefore closely connected to an 
accused’s presumption of innocence18 and the ability of the defence to challenge the 
prosecutions’ case. 
The accused’s rights to know the case, and to time and facilities to prepare a defence, are 
closely linked.19 Disclosure affects both these rights, and how they interact. Without 
disclosure, a defendant will not know the prosecution case they are expected to address, and 
thus will not be able to adequately prepare. It is for this reason that Colleen Rohan argues that 
prosecution disclosure ‘is the sole means for affording the accused adequate time and 
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12 Rome Statute art 67(1)(b). 
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31. 
15 Ibid, 31. 
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facilities in which to investigate that evidence and prepare to meet it at trial’.20 International 
criminal defence lawyer Wayne Jordash also notes the close connection between timely 
disclosure and the ability to prepare a defence case, particularly in complex cases concerning 
years of armed conflict and involving allegations of complex modes of liability.21 He points 
out that: 
The devil of a Prosecution and Defence case is in the detail provided by this 
disclosure. The smallest of details may prove important and the more that 
are available at an early stage the better. This aids the taking of instructions, 
detailed investigations, the planning of overall strategy, and trial 
management, including efficient and focused court sessions.22  
Because the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence and need not run an affirmative 
defence case (but can simply put the prosecution’s case to proof), time and facilities to 
prepare a defence includes an ability to run investigations, and to be able to address the 
prosecution’s evidence and case theory from the commencement of trial.23 Time and facilities 
to prepare a defence should not, therefore, be understood as only relevant to running a 
defence phase of the trial: rather, the right applies to trial readiness. Disclosure must be 
provided in a manner that allows it to be integrated into a defence case from the outset; if it is 
not, the utility of the information could be limited, and there may be a negative impact on the 
accused’s time and facilities to prepare – both in relation to examination of particular 
witnesses, and to the overall case. 
The accused should be able to enjoy these rights ‘in full equality’.24 The principle of equality 
of arms includes that neither party is placed at a material disadvantage viz the other party, 
with regards to information.25 Disclosure regulates the relationship between the parties, 
through requiring a party with an informational advantage to provide that information to the 
other party. Such informational parity should ensure that the trial is not an ‘ambush’.26 
Disclosure of information between the parties is therefore integral to the right to equality of 
arms between the parties, and as Masha Fedorova argues, without access to necessary 
                                                          
20 Colleen Rohan, ‘Protecting the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal Proceedings: Lip Service or 
Affirmative Action?’ in William A. Schabas, Yvonne McDermott and Niamh Hayes (eds), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law (Ashgate, 2013), 289. See also Wayne Jordash, Fairness of 
Karadzic trial in question (4 October 2010)  International Justice Tribune, <http://www.rnw.nl/international-
justice/article/fairness-karadzic-trial-question> 
21 Jordash, above n 20. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Rohan, above n 20, 290-291. 
24 Rome Statute art 67. 
25 See Masha Fedorova, The Principle of Equality of Arms in International Criminal Proceedings (Intersentia, 
2012), 233-302. 
26 Ibid. 
information, ‘a meaningful equality of arms cannot be sustained’.27 While disclosure 
obligations exist for both the prosecution and the defence,28 such obligations tend to be more 
onerous on the prosecution. This is for two main reasons: first, the burden of proof rests on 
the prosecution, meaning they bear primary responsibility for gathering the evidence (and 
then disclosing it to the defence); and second, the prosecutor ‘enjoys massive advantages in 
the facilities for the gathering of evidence’.29 These resources – including investigators, 
search warrants, the ability to initiate investigations, and certain powers that accompany the 
status of a prosecutorial office30 – are usually far in excess of those available to the defence, 
and grant the prosecution ‘superior, and sometimes even sole access to this material’.31 The 
ability to obtain material thus necessitates a degree of ‘equalising’ between the parties,32 and 
prosecution disclosure obligations exist, in part, to redress the imbalance between the 
parties.33 Disclosure obligations thereby operate to ensure the principle of equality of arms.   
The ICC has taken further steps to ensure equality of arms, by placing a burden on the 
prosecutor to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances alike, and to disclose 
all evidence to the defence that appears relevant to both the defence and the prosecution 
cases.34 This provision, however, reinforces the need for appropriate disclosure: the 
prosecutor’s duty to investigate exonerating material is only effective if the potentially 
exculpatory material is disclosed to the defence. As the below analysis will show, the 
emerging practice of the ICC permits non-disclosure of exculpatory material – which may 
pose a particular challenge for the full and proper utility of this requirement. 
The relationship between disclosure and the rights of an accused is therefore a strong one. As 
trials are key accountability mechanisms for violations of international humanitarian and 
criminal law, the relationship between these constituent elements of trial is an important area 
of enquiry when we examine accountability for such violations. This chapter moves from the 
theoretical to the practical, with an examination of the relationship between trial fairness, 
                                                          
27 Ibid 233-234.  
28 For an examination of defence disclosure obligations,  see Kate Gibson and Cainnech Lussiaà-Berdou, 
‘Disclosure of Evidence’ in Karim A.A. Khan, Caroline Buisman, and Christopher Gosnell (eds), Principles of 
Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2010) 306, 338-344. 
29 Büngener, above n 6, 350. 
30 Ibid; Fedorova, above n 26, 234.  
31 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Decision on Appellant’s Notice and Supplemental Notice of Prosecution’s 
Non-Compliance with its Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 68 of the Rules) (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III, Case No IT-95-14/2, 11 February 2004) [17]. 
32 Fedorova, above n 25, 234.  
33 Gibson and Lussiaà-Berdou, above n 28, 306. 
34 Rome Statute arts 54(1)(a) and 54(1)(f). 
rights, and rules in relation to the way disclosure is undertaken at the ICC. While there may 
be other areas of disclosure practices that may be concerning, such as disclosure provided in 
an untimely manner, this chapter focuses solely on matters of non-disclosure at the ICC. 
A. Non-Disclosure at the ICC: The Role of Victims, and The Use of Confidentiality 
Agreements By Prosecutors 
Despite the importance of disclosure outlined above, the ICC’s Rules – and their 
implementation by Trial Chambers – permit an environment of non-disclosure. Here, I 
examine two emerging issues: first, the non-disclosure of exculpatory material in the 
possession of the prosecution; and second, the lack of clarity around the disclosure 
responsibilities of Victims’ Representatives, and potential non-disclosure of material 
(including potentially exculpatory material) in the possession of the victims. As a result, the 
ability of the accused to construct an effective defence is limited, and they may be at an 
informational disadvantage. The rules permitting non-disclosure also curtail the ability of 
Trial Chambers to manage the informational disparity and the relationships between the 
participants of the trial. This environment of non-disclosure at the ICC may therefore have a 
significant effect on the rights of the accused to know the case and to time and facilities to 
prepare a defence, as well as the principle of equality of arms. This demonstrates a fracture 
between the procedural rules governing disclosure, and the rights of the accused. Rather than 
being mutually reinforcing, the ability of prosecutors and victims to withhold disclosure 
means that procedural rules permit an environment where the rights of the accused are 
restricted, rather than such rules being undertaken in a way that ensures the trial is undertaken 
with ‘full respect’ for the accused’s rights. While trials are a key accountability mechanism 
for violations of international humanitarian and criminal law, they are presently being 
conducted in a way that allows these disconnections between procedural rules, rights, and 
trial fairness. 
1.  Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Material held by the Prosecutor 
The first major issue is non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory material in the prosecution’s 
control. Given the importance of disclosure, outlined above, restrictions on disclosure must 
be strictly limited and non-disclosure must be properly viewed as the exception rather than 
the rule.35 However, the ICC’s disclosure rules include several provisions that allow for non-
                                                          
35 Bernhard Kuschnik, ‘International Criminal Due Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the Proceedings 
Before the ICC’ (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 157, 166; Büngener, above n 6, 361. 
disclosure of material.36 There is concern at how these provisions for non-disclosure 
reconcile with the necessity for prosecution disclosure to the defence of exculpatory 
materials.  
Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute places an obligation on the prosecutor to disclose 
potentially exculpatory material in its possession to the defence as soon as practicable.37 The 
fact that this provision is part of the Article in the Rome Statute that governs ‘Rights of the 
accused’ is demonstrative of the centrality of exculpatory material to the accused’s rights. 
This has been further reinforced by ICC Trial Chambers, who have ruled that the right to a 
fair trial includes an entitlement to disclosure of exculpatory material.38 Exculpatory material 
is that which, in the prosecution’s view, ‘shows or tends to show the innocence of the 
accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of 
prosecution evidence’.39 In case of any doubt as to the application of this provision, the Court 
will decide.40 Yet while the disclosure of potentially exculpatory material is therefore 
mandated under the disclosure rules, is formulated as constitutive of the rights of the accused, 
and is understood by Trial Chambers as integral to a fair trial, the ICC’s governing laws also 
establish permission for such materials to be withheld. Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute 
(read conjunctively with Rule 82 of the ICC Rules) provides for non-disclosure of material 
that the prosecution has obtained under confidentiality arrangements with sources, and that is 
to be used solely as ‘springboard’ information to generate new evidence.41 This can only be 
introduced into evidence after the consent of the provider has been given, and there has been 
‘adequate prior disclosure to the accused’.42 These provisions – on the one hand, 
                                                          
36 Kuschnik, above n 35, 166. Non-disclosure may occur due to the material being an ‘internal document’, that it 
may ‘prejudice further ongoing investigations’ of the OTP; that non-disclosure ensures the confidentiality of the 
material; that non-disclosure is aimed to ‘protect the safety of witnesses and victims and members of their 
families’; or that the material may be withheld if it relates to the ‘steps that have been taken’ by the OTP to 
either ensure the confidentiality of the information, or the protection of the witnesses, victims, and members of 
their families. See ICC Rules, r 81. 
37 Rome Statute, art 67(2). 
38 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered 
by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused, Together with 
Certain other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008) (International Criminal Court, Trial 
Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2008) (‘Lubanga Decision on the Consequences of Non-
Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials’) [34]. 
39 Rome Statute art 67(2). See also Lubanga Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Materials (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2008) [59]. 
40 Rome Statute art 67(2). 
41 ICC Rules r 82 (which regulates non-disclosure pursuant to Rome Statute art 54(3)(e)).  
42 Ibid. 
necessitating disclosure of exculpatory material; on the other, permitting its non-disclosure – 
have been described as constituting a ‘collision course’ present in the Rome Statute itself.43  
The challenge of necessitating disclosure of exculpatory material, but permitting the non-
disclosure of some materials, has been the subject of litigation in both the Lubanga and 
Katanga cases. In the Lubanga case,44 the use of information from intermediaries gathered 
under Article 54(3)(e) and the non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence led to a stay in 
proceedings: a measure that was closely linked to the rights of the accused and the fairness of 
the trial.45 This stay in proceedings has been used as evidence to support an argument that 
Trial Chambers put ‘weight on fairness and impartiality, rather than speediness when 
conducting the trials’.46 The stay in proceedings does demonstrate the commitment of that 
Trial Chamber to ensuring that the defence received the necessary information. This may be 
seen as a positive indicator, that the Trial Chamber is prepared to do ‘anything it takes’ to 
ensure the defence receives the material it requires, that the rights of the accused are upheld, 
and that the fairness of the proceedings is not compromised. Thus on one interpretation, the 
stay could be seen as a positive step for the position of the rights of the accused and the 
fairness of the trial with regards to the procedure governing the conduct of the trial.47 In the 
absence of disclosure rules being complied with in a way that reinforces the rights of the 
accused and trial fairness, the trial cannot be permitted to continue.  
However, there is another way of viewing the Lubanga stay of proceedings, and an overly 
optimistic interpretation should be cautioned against. As a preliminary point, it should be 
remembered that while ultimately the defence gained the initially undisclosed material, this 
                                                          
43 Christian M De Vos, ‘Case Note: Prosecutor v Lubanga. ‘Someone Who Comes Between One Person and 
Another: Lubanga, Local Cooperation and the Right to a Fair Trial’’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 217, 231. 
44 The details of the Decisions in the Lubanga case have been thoroughly addressed by other authors; see, eg, De 
Vos, above n 43; Sabine Swoboda, ‘The ICC Disclosure Regime – A Defence Perspective’ (2008) 19 Criminal 
Law Forum 449, 459; Rachel Katzman, ‘The Non-Disclosure of Confidential Exculpatory Evidence and the 
Lubanga Proceedings: How the ICC Defence System Affects the Accused’s Right to a Fair Trial’ (2009) 8 (1) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 77; Sara Anoushirvani, ‘The Future of the International 
Criminal Court: The Long Road to Legitimacy Begins with the Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (2010) 22 (1) 
Pace International Law Review 213. 
45 Lubanga Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials (International Criminal 
Court, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 13 June 2008). 
46 Kuschnik above n 36, 185. See also Anoushrivani, who argues that the Trial Chamber’s ‘emphasis on a 
defendant‘s right to a fair trial is highlighted in its decision imposing the stay, serving to further legitimise its 
decision and its role as an impartial international criminal tribunal’ (Anoushrivani, above n 44, 224). 
47 See eg Anoushvirani, who argues that ‘By imposing a stay on the proceedings, the ICC is emphasizing the 
importance of a fair trial’ (Anoushirvani, above n 44, 222).  
was ‘at the cost of resources, time and extended custody for Mr Lubanga’.48 In addition, the 
stay in proceedings demonstrates a significant challenge for the Trial Chamber: that they 
were unable to regulate the relationship between the parties, uphold procedure, and ensure the 
rights of the Accused and the fairness of the trial, by any less radical means. A stay in 
proceedings is a significant step for a Trial Chamber to take, and will not be entered into 
lightly. It is prima facie incompatible with a Chamber’s statutory responsibility to ensure an 
expeditious trial.49 It is not satisfactory that, in order for the Trial Chamber to ensure trial 
safety, they must stop proceedings. Here, the fact that the Trial Chamber had to go to such 
measures to ensure some acceptable level of informational parity between the parties 
demonstrates the flaws in the present system.  
The proceedings in Lubanga are precedent for the fact that a prosecutor cannot use the 
provision of Article 54(3)(e) to gather materials in a widespread manner and not disclose 
them. In that case, the prosecutor received over 50% of its documentary evidence on 
condition of confidentiality.50 The Trial Chamber deemed this broad use of Article 54(3)(e) 
in the Lubanga case to be incorrect.51 However, it is still possible for a prosecutor to gather 
exculpatory material and not disclose it to the defence under this provision. There remains an 
inherent tension in the Rome Statute between the provisions to gather material under 
confidentiality agreements, and to disclose exculpatory material to the defence. While the 
Lubanga stay of proceedings shows that the widespread use of confidentiality agreements is 
incorrect, and shows how seriously Trial Chambers view the right of the accused to 
disclosure of exculpatory material, it also demonstrates how difficult this tension in the Rome 
Statute can be for Trial Chambers to resolve. Their role to properly regulate the relationships 
of the parties, and to give full respect to the rights of the accused, are both limited by this 
permission of non-disclosure of exculpatory material.  
An examination of the Lubanga case reveals that non-disclosure of exculpatory materials in 
the possession of the prosecutor has been a significant issue in the way disclosure is 
undertaken at the ICC. Non-disclosure of material due to confidentiality agreements under 
                                                          
48 Peter Morrissey, ‘Applied Rights in International Criminal Law: Defence Counsel and the Right to 
Disclosure’, in Gideon Boas, William A. Schabas and Michael P. Scharf (eds), International Criminal Justice: 
Legitimacy and Coherence (Edward Elgar, 2012) 68, 90. 
49 Rome Statute art 64(2). 
50 Swoboda above n 44, 463. 
51 Lubanga Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials (International Criminal 
Court, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, 13 June 2008). 
Article 54(3)(e) has continued to be problematic in the case of Katanga,52 which shows that 
the internal inconsistencies in the Statute remain challenging. In spite of the accepted 
importance of disclosure of exculpatory material, there is nonetheless an environment of non-
disclosure, permitted by the rules. Trial Chambers are limited in their ability to manage this, 
without resorting to the extreme measure of a stay of proceedings. Significant questions are 
raised around how the rights of an accused can be given full respect in a trial environment 
that explicitly permits exculpatory materials to be withheld. In turn, the connection between 
the procedural rules and the accused’s rights starts to show a splintering. 
2.  Non-Disclosure by Victims 
The second major issue emerging from the current disclosure regime at the ICC is the non-
disclosure of material (both exculpatory and incriminating) held by victims’ representatives. 
Unlike earlier international criminal institutions, where victims could only participate in 
international criminal trials as witnesses,53 the ICC provides scope for victims to ‘participate’ 
in trials. The novel system of increased victim participation brings with it as yet unresolved 
questions about the management of information and disclosure, as well as the regulation of 
the disclosure relationship between the trial participants. Mirjan Damaška has noted the 
tension between this increased role for victims, the fairness of trial, and the rights of the 
accused, when he argued that ‘the greatest stress on considerations of fairness toward the 
defendant comes from the ennobling ambition of [the ICC] to place justice for victims at the 
heart of [its] mission’.54 
                                                          
52 Prosecutor v Katanga (Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or 
Otherwise Material to the Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing) (International Criminal Court, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07-621, 20 June 2008) [3]–[6].  
53 Zappalà, above n 7, 137-8. For a more comprehensive examination of the role of victims participants in ICC 
proceedings than what is practicable in the current chapter, see: Christine Van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims before 
International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’ (2011) 44 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 475; Claude Jorda and Jerôme de Hemptinne, ‘The status and role of the 
victim’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 2, (Oxford University Press, 2002) 1387; Emily Haslam, ‘Victim 
Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope over Experience?’ in Dominic 
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and 
Policy Issues (Hart, 2004) 315; Håkan Friman, ‘The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: 
A Third Party to the Proceedings?’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 485; Charles P Trumbull IV, 
‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’ (2008) 29 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 777; and Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victims’ Rights and the International Criminal Court: 
Perceptions within the Court regarding the Victims’ Right to Participate’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 629. 
54 Mirjan Damaška, ‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2001) 36(2) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 365, 372. 
While increased victims participation need not necessarily be prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused,55 the broader issue of the appropriate balance between the rights of the accused and 
the interests of the victims can be examined in the framework of the application of particular 
procedural rules. Here, the rules governing disclosure provide an examination of how 
victims’ participation is conducted, and whether the rights of an accused are afforded ‘full 
respect’. 
Victims’ Representatives are not a party to the trial,56 and they are fundamentally motivated 
by different aims than the prosecution.57 However, under Rule 68(3), where the ‘personal 
interests’ of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit the views and concerns of victims 
to be presented and considered at an appropriate stage of the proceedings.58 This will be done 
in a manner ‘not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial’.59 In this way, while there is no specific right for victims to present evidence, 
they may apply to the Trial Chamber to do so.60 It is likely that victims would have standing 
on matters of disclosure.61 Yet while they enjoy these abilities, Victims’ Representatives do 
not hold the same duties or responsibilities of disclosure as do prosecutors.62 There is no duty 
of Victims’ Representatives to undertake disclosure in the ICC’s procedural framework.63 As 
the Lubanga Trial Chamber reinforced, the disclosure regime only applies to prosecutors: 
there is ‘no positive obligation … on the other organs of the Court, the defence or the 
participants to disclose exculpatory material to the defence under Article 67(2) of the Statute, 
Rule 76 or Rule 77 of the Rules’.64 The Katanga Trial Chamber noted the lack of obligation 
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for Victims’ Representatives under the ICC’s Statute and Rules, and further noted that given 
the lack of a specific right for victims to present evidence, there can be no duty on the victims 
to disclose evidence.65 This is true regardless of whether the evidence in their possession is 
incriminating or exculpatory.66 This approach was approved by the Appeals Chamber.67 Yet 
in spite of its acceptance by both Trial and Appeals Chambers, such non-disclosure is 
questionable. As Christine van den Wyngaert, writing extra-judicially, has noted ‘[t]his might 
strike some as odd: how can victims have a right to tender incriminating evidence without a 
corresponding duty to disclose exculpatory material?’68 
The lack of disclosure obligations means that information which comes under the possession 
or control of Victims’ Representatives may never be provided to the parties – and in 
particular, to the defence. Victims are not entitled to conduct investigations in order to 
establish the guilt of the accused, as this would effectively make them second prosecutors and 
would ‘be prejudicial to the rights of the Defence, the principle of equality of arms and the 
requirements of a fair trial’.69 However, victims are able to undertake investigations ‘in order 
to collect information with a view to establishing the existence, nature and extent of the harm 
suffered’.70 This ability to undertake investigations could result in key material being under 
their control.71 Indeed, Victims’ Representatives may have even greater access to such 
materials than prosecution staff, as a result of their role to represent victims. The accused 
does not then have any access to this material, and given the lack of disclosure obligations on 
the victims, there is no requirement for them to disclose this material to the defence – 
regardless of whether the material is incriminating or potentially exculpatory.72 The 
problematic nature of this is further reinforced by the fact that, unlike the prosecution, victims 
are not under an obligation to be objective.73  
In the Katanga case, the Appeals Chamber noted the prosecutor’s responsibility to investigate 
exonerating and incriminating circumstances equally, under Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome 
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Statute, and therefore considered that it would be reasonable for the prosecutor’s 
investigation to extend to discovering any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the 
victims.74 This information would then have to be disclosed to the accused under Article 
67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the ICC Rules.75 However, this approach is predicated on 
an assumption that the prosecutor will become aware of the existence of this information. 
There is no guarantee that the prosecutor will discover this information: it may remain solely 
under the control of, and knowledge of, the victims. There is no legal obligation on the 
victims to inform the prosecution of such material, or its existence. Indeed, it is difficult to 
see why Victims’ Representatives who have control over exculpatory material would make 
this known to the prosecution. As aforementioned, the motivations of the Victims’ 
Representatives are different from those of the prosecutor; such motivations may not align 
with exculpatory material being investigated by the prosecutor. Indeed, it may be in the 
interests of victims to withhold that information.  
As a result, Victims’ Representatives may hold exculpatory material which the defence 
cannot access, and which the victims are under no obligation to provide to the defence (or to 
notify the prosecutor of, for subsequent investigation and disclosure). The potential impact of 
this on the accused’s right to time and facilities to prepare their case is significant. If the 
defence cannot access material which suggests their innocence or undermines the credibility 
of a prosecution witness against them, their ability to mount an effective defence is curtailed. 
This situation also poses problems for the role of the Trial Chamber to regulate the 
informational relationship between the prosecution and defence, and to ensure equality of 
arms between the parties. While the victims are not a party to the trial, they may hold 
information which effects the prosecution case. For example, the non-disclosure of 
information which goes to undermine the credibility of a prosecution witness may place the 
prosecution’s evidence at an advantage which the defence could have challenged, had it had 
access to the exculpatory material. In the absence of an obligation on Victims’ 
Representatives to disclose any exculpatory material in their possession or under their 
control, the ability of a Trial Chamber to manage this aspect of the disclosure regime and the 
informational relationship between the parties will be limited. 
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There is also no clear guidance around the responsibility of Victims’ Representatives to 
provide disclosure of incriminating documents they themselves seek to rely upon in the 
proceedings. The Ngudjolo Chui defence team in the Katanga case argued that allowing 
victims to lead incriminating evidence would be to effectively make victims a second 
prosecutor.76 This argument shows the concern held by some defence teams, regarding 
equality of arms issues and the ability of victims to lead this evidence. In the Lubanga case, 
the Trial Chamber held that ‘victims participating in the proceedings may be permitted to 
tender and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist in the determination 
of the truth’.77 This approach has been reiterated by the Appeals Chamber,78 and by other 
Trial Chambers.79 However, the Trial Chamber did not provide guidance as to whether the 
victims would need to disclose any documents to the defence before seeking to tender them. 
This issue was appealed, but the Appeals Chamber also failed to provide a Decision on this 
point. Instead, the Appeals Chamber remitted the issue to the Trial Chamber to decide on a 
case-by-case basis, noting that the Trial Chamber ‘could rule on the modalities for the proper 
disclosure of such evidence before allowing it to be introduced’.80  
In the Katanga case, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber may request the 
victims to submit evidence that was not previously disclosed to the accused.81 The Appeals 
Chamber specifically noted that this was not incompatible with the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.82 If victims are authorised to present evidence, it is for the Trial Chamber to set the 
modalities of disclosure ‘and to decide on the measures required to safeguard the fairness of 
the trial, given the need to respect the rights of the accused, but also the interests of the 
victims’.83 The Katanga Trial Chamber specified a procedure for Victims’ Representatives to 
tender documentary evidence, which would involve making a written application to the Trial 
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Chamber regarding the documents they intend to present, showing their relevance and ‘how 
they may contribute to the determination of the truth’.84 The application, and the documents, 
‘must be notified to the parties … for their observations’.85 Such a procedure, however, does 
not require the disclosure of the actual document to the parties: simply the ‘notification’ of 
the document. Non-disclosure of the actual material is therefore still permitted under this 
procedure. The Chamber will only authorise the presentation of evidence ‘provided that it is 
not prejudicial to the Defence or to the fairness or impartiality of the trial’.86  
In the Katanga decision, the Appeals Chamber also acknowledged the link between 
disclosure processes, material held by victims, and defence resources. They ruled that, in the 
case where a Trial Chamber requests the victims to submit evidence that was not previously 
disclosed to the accused, the Trial Chamber must order disclosure of this material to the 
accused ‘sufficiently in advance of its presentation at the trial, and take any other measures 
necessary to ensure the accused’s right to a fair trial, in particular the right ‘to have adequate 
time and facilities for the preparation of the defence’’.87 This is the correct approach. 
Nonetheless, concerns about the effect of victims participation on defence resources, and 
thereby the defence’s time and facilities to prepare their case, goes beyond the question of 
disclosure of material held by the victims. Another concern is around victim participation on 
disclosure issues, and their potential standing to make submissions in this regard. While 
victims are not intended to act as a second prosecutor, defence teams face two opponents with 
the capacity to make submissions on disclosure issues. In the course of responding to such 
submissions from victims as well as prosecutors, ‘defence resources are stretched, time is 
wasted and disclosure is compromised’.88 This also poses significant issues for the equality of 
arms in the proceedings.89  
There is therefore a multitude of issues regarding the role of victims and non-disclosure of 
material to the parties (particularly the accused), and these issues may be cumulative. It may 
be that victims hold exculpatory material which they do not disclose; seek to rely on 
incriminating documents which they have not previously disclosed; and can intervene in 
disclosure matters while speaking to the guilt of the accused. The impact of these issues on 
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the rights of the accused to time and facilities to prepare a defence, to know the case, and to 
equality of arms, has the potential to be significant. The ‘splintering’ that we have witnessed 
between rules, rights, and fairness, in relation to prosecution non-disclosure of exculpatory 
material, now deepens. In light of this non-disclosure by victims, we can notice what we 
might call a ‘fracturing’ between these trial elements of rules, rights, and fairness. 
These two issues of non-disclosure of information by victims and prosecution pose 
challenges for the rights of the accused to time and facilities to prepare their case, to know the 
case against them, and for the principle of equality of arms. If an accused cannot access 
potentially exculpatory material in the possession of either the Victims’ Representatives, or 
the prosecution, they are at an informational disadvantage in the case; and are at a 
disadvantage in terms of preparing their defence. These rules contribute to an environment 
where the rights of an accused are limited rather than given ‘full respect’; and the 
implementation by Trial Chambers of these rules facilitates such an environment. These two 
issues also demonstrate the difficulties Trial Chambers face in attempting to regulate the 
relationships between the parties at trial. The rules permitting non-disclosure curtail the 
ability of Trial Chambers to manage the informational parity between the parties. It has been 
shown that there is a fracture between the way the disclosure is undertaken – namely, that it 
may be withheld – and the rights of the accused, which are limited by this, rather than 
reinforced.  
III. FAIRNESS, RIGHTS, AND DISCLOSURE RULES: DISCONNECTED AND FRACTURED ASPECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS? 
The rules that govern the disclosure regime at the ICC, and their application by Trial and 
Appeals Chambers, provide a particular area of enquiry about the interaction of procedural 
rules, the rights of the accused, and the overall fairness of the trial. In theory, these three 
elements are mutually dependent: a Trial Chamber has a responsibility to ensure a trial that is 
fair, and conducted with ‘full respect’ for the rights of an accused; this respect is ensured 
through processes governed by rules. Specifically, there is a clear connection between 
disclosure rules and trial fairness, and it has even been said that disclosure is ‘arguably the 
most important mechanism for ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial’.90  
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However, as this chapter shows, there are two emerging issues with how disclosure is 
undertaken at the ICC, which suggests a fracturing between these procedural rules and the 
rights of an accused. The disclosure rules, and their application by Chambers, permit an 
environment of non-disclosure to the defence by both prosecutors and victims. There are 
significant implications for an accused’s rights – in particular, to time and facilities to prepare 
a defence, and to know the case against them – as well as the principle of equality of arms. 
The ability of Trial Chambers to protect and promote the rights of the accused, and to 
regulate the relationships between the parties, is curtailed in this trial environment. The above 
may be further evidence of the claim made by Kate Gibson and Cainnech Lussiaà-Berdou, 
that Chambers ‘regularly recall the importance of disclosure as a fundamental component of 
fair trials’, but that nonetheless, ‘the effectiveness of the fair trial safeguards contemplated by 
the disclosure regime in the rules has been reduced’.91 The question then becomes how this 
lack of ‘full respect’ for the rights of an accused ultimately affects the fairness of the trial. 
ICC trials are a key mechanism for ensuring accountability for violations of international 
humanitarian and criminal law. Yet the way that disclosure is being undertaken in these trials 
– facilitating a fracturing of procedural rules, rights, and fairness – may pose difficulties for 
accountability for such violations. The ICC’s mission, to end impunity for ‘the most serious 
crimes of international concern’, is not assisted by trials that fail to adhere to their most 
fundamental requirement: that they are ‘fair […] and conducted with full respect for the 




                                                          
91 Ibid, 313. 
92 Rome Statute art 64(2). 
